Patent Purchase as a Policy for Pharmaceuticals by McHardy, J.P. et al.
   
 Patent Purchase as a Policy for Pharmaceuticals 
 
Ben van Hout, Jolian McHardy and Aki Tsuchiya 
  
ISSN 1749-8368 
 
SERPS no. 2015007 
 
March 2015 
 
 
 
Patent Purchase as a Policy for Pharmaceuticals ∗
Ben van Hout1, Jolian McHardy†2, and Aki Tsuchiya3
1HEDS, ScHARR, University of Sheffield
2Department of Economics, University of Sheffield & Rimini Centre for
Economic Analysis, Italy
3HEDS, ScHARR & Department of Economics, University of Sheffield
Abstract
We often observe that when the first of a new class of drug is patented it does not halt
the development of further drugs of the same class resulting in a number of drugs with
similar efficacy and price well above production costs. We construct a life-cycle analysis
of the welfare gains from a policy for pharmaceutical patenting where society grants and
purchases the patent of the first of a new class of drug (instead of purchasing the drug),
awarding no further patents to runner-up drugs, and producing or licensing production
with price set to maximise welfare subject to covering costs. We show that under such a
policy society could substantially reduce the cost of duplicated R&D and the price of the
drug benefiting more patients and producing large health gains. The results are generated
based upon a number of stylised facts regarding R&D in the pharmaceutical industry.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the idea of a patenting policy in the pharmaceutical industry under which
society grants and buys the patent of the first of a new class of drug, instead of purchasing
the drug, and awards no further patents to runner-up drugs. Society then produces or licenses
production with price set to achieve some objective e.g. maximising welfare subject to covering
costs.1 The paper shows, within a drug life-cycle framework, that the proposed approach can
yield welfare improvements over what we stylise as current practice.
To give some context, consider PCSK9, an enzyme which plays a role in the production of
cholesterol. Blocking it may reduce cholesterol, which is what has led several pharmaceutical
companies to invest in the development of PCSK9 blockers. It is expected that within 5 to 10
years there may be three products on the market. The first of these (if successful) will show
an unprecedented decrease in cholesterol, and be priced at a premium, say £2,000 a year per
patient. The second and third products will have marginal differences in efficacy from the first,
and will be priced similarly. At this price, it is likely that not all individuals who may benefit
will be treated, because it is not cost effective. So, for example, only high risk patients will be
treated. This is a pattern observed across numerous classes of drugs. However, the price may
well be much higher than the production costs. If so, by buying the patent and producing the
drug (or licensing production under a set price and recouping revenues with a per unit fee), the
drug can be sold at or, at least nearer, the marginal cost of production and hence benefit more
patients from it yielding larger health gains.
In brief, the gains associated with this policy come from avoiding cost-duplication from rival
firms seeking to achieve follow-up patents but also because, after the winning firm has been
compensated and the patent purchased, the price that can be charged to cover the associated
costs is lower than would prevail in the market subsequent to the awarding of a runner-up
rival patent. In the main, the focus of this paper is upon the gains in welfare that can be
achieved via the patent purchase policy looking only at life-cycle of a single drug and therefore
1Whilst we employ a break-even constraint in this paper this is only illustrative and in practice society may
wish to actively subsidise R&D as we discuss later.
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taking a strictly partial equilibrium approach which ignores other benefits from the policy
in terms of new drug development outside this drug’s life-cycle. In this partial equilibrium
(one-shot) setting we show that under the patent purchase policy, social welfare is increased,
the winner is fully compensated, but the runner-up firm incurs losses. Whilst we later show
that the loses to the runner-up firm may be very small under the patent purchase policy, we
also consider a break-even compensation rule under which, with repeated plays of the game
(applying the patent purchase policy over a number of drug life-cycles), firms’ expected profits
are unchanged with the introduction of the new patent policy but significant welfare gains can
still be achieved. The results are generated based upon a number of stylised facts regarding
R&D in the pharmaceutical industry which are discussed in Section 2.
Patent “buyouts”, which involve the government buying the patent from the innovating
firm and placing it in the public domain, effectively replace Intellectual Property (IP) protec-
tion and associated profits with a prize for the innovator (in this paper the prize is a stream
of income related to sales per period). By placing the innovation in the public domain the
government achieves, in theory, the eradication of monopoly price distortions as well as the
disincentivisation of duplicative research efforts. The idea of patent buyouts is not a new one
(e.g. the Daguerreotype photography patent was subject to a buyout by the French govern-
ment in 1839) and the arguments relating to their potential benefits have been documented
for some time (e.g. Marshall, 1890; Wright, 1983). Yet patent buyouts have so far failed to
become an established policy option for governments. So what are the practical barriers to
the implementation of patent buyouts? In addition to the obvious issue of funding the op-
erational and organisational costs of patent buyouts there are important considerations about
which patents to buyout and how much to compensate the innovator. On both the “which” and
“how much” questions there exist possible difficulties about identifying the value (private and
social) of innovations as well as possible distortive rent seeking and lobbying concerns. These
are informational considerations arising where the innovator has ex post private information
(i.e. in the case of drugs, their efficacy). Indeed, Weyl and Tirole (2012, pp. 1972) draw
the following conclusion: ‘Despite the extensive theoretical and policy interest in ... the prize
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system, many consider it simply impractical. Yet it is hard to see what, other than informa-
tional asymmetries, could be the source of such “impracticality.”’ Their paper focusses on the
importance of the screening benefit of market power in revealing the value of an innovation
when the innovator has (multidimensional) ex post private information. This follows the line of
reasoning expounded by Smith (1762) that market-driven rewards help elicit which opportuni-
ties justify the associated development costs. Whilst the prize system yields benefits in terms
of avoiding monopoly price distortions associated with IP, the downside is that if the pricing
mechanism is not market-based then it may be difficult for the government to value and select
the most worthy innovations. However, the value of screening diminishes as the extent of ex
post private information about the value of the innovation falls. Weyl and Tirole (2012) make
the distinction, for instance, between (i) pharmaceutical drug innovations, and (ii) high-tech
products such as software and tablet computers, with the former generally being more suitable
for prize-based rewards and the latter tending more towards requiring market-based screening.
With pharmaceutical innovations it is reasonable to argue that private information of the in-
novator is typically reduced considerably by clinical trials (which are required for the drug to
be registered). With new high-tech products, on the other hand, it is often very difficult to
determine value until this has been revealed through the market.
Weyl and Tirole (2012) are not alone in identifying that conditions in the pharmaceutical
industry lend it particularly well to the buyout model. Kremer (1998), who advocates an
auction-based pricing system for valuing pharmaceutical innovations in a buyout regime, argues
that the high mark-ups and low, and typically homogenous, production costs of a drug placed in
the public domain are likely to result in large gains from buyouts in the pharmaceutical sector.
On the one hand, low levels of private information associated with pharmaceutical innovations
reduce the costs of identifying and valuing the innovation and therefore operating an effective
buyout regime.2 On the other hand, the high mark-ups and low and homogenous production
2Drug development has many phases which starts at the conceptual pre clinical phase followed by a series
of research with human subjects across phase I, phase II and phase III and sometimes phase IV clinical trials.
Phase I trials assess safety in healthy volunteers, Phase II are typically designed to identify the optimal dose,
to confirm safety and form initial figures on efficacy, and phase III studies are largely to further assess safety
and efficacy. Phase IV trials are often designed to observe efficacy in practice. Most often, the results from
each phase are published and competitors know how far their rivals are in the development process. Moreover,
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costs suggest large end-user gains from the buyout relative to IP. Low costs and high rewards
increase the likelihood that buyouts in the pharmaceutical sector will be cost effective and
may well generate large net benefits. It is not surprising, therefore, that the buyout model
for pharmaceutical innovations has attracted particular support in the literature (e.g., Kremer,
1998, 2000a,b; Hollis, 2004). Indeed, Guell and Fischbaum (1995)3 attempt to place an estimate
on the welfare gains from buyouts in the US pharmaceutical sector. Based on static Harberger
(1954) dead-weight loss triangle arguments they arrive at a low-end estimate of $3bn, whilst
an upper-end estimate of $30bn is achieved by including rent seeking (marketing). They argue
that in the low-end scenario the benefits are in line with the costs of implementing the regime,
hence for most of the range of estimates, the buyout policy is cost-effective, at the top end very
heavily so.
In this paper we seek to address the issue of the potential welfare gains from patent buyouts
in the pharmaceutical sector from a partial equilibrium drug life-cycle perspective. Most of the
existing literature has sought to examine the welfare gains based on the static price distortion
under an IP approach and/or the rent seeking associated with marketing expenditures (e.g.
Guell and Fischbaum, 1995; Guell, 1997; Guell and Fischbaum, 1997). However, we are inter-
ested in understanding how a patent purchase policy will impact on costs and benefits from the
development stage of a drug through to its obsolescence, which necessarily captures additional
benefits such as the avoidance of duplicatory R&D. Much of the literature on pharmaceutical
R&D has concerned pricing mechanisms, in particular, to bring about efficient R&D investment
(see, Gravelle, 1998; Kremer, 1998), which often involve subsidies from taxation. However, in
the current paper we are not concerned so much with finding an optimal pricing rule as identi-
fying scope for welfare gains largely treating the rate of R&D investment as a constant without
the need for subsidies and without necessarily harming expected profits. By showing that the
welfare gains under these circumstances are potentially very large with large gains robust to
the relaxation of some of our simplifying assumptions, it leaves open the possibility to pursue
new trials are publicly announced and details are published. This is for example the case for the new PKC-9
inhibitors which include evolocumab, bocozizumab, and alirocumab.
3See also Guell (1997); Guell and Fischbaum (1997).
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further welfare gains not captured in our analysis, such as through an optimal pricing rule with
endogenous R&D and subsidies.
In the following Section we introduce and analyse a simple three-period drug life-cycle
model under policy A (representing current practice) and the patent purchase policy B under
various pricing scenarios. In Section 3, we carry out a simulation exercise to see what sort
of gains in welfare are available under policy B relative to policy A for different hypothetical
parameterisations of the basic model. In Section 4 we seek to understand the implications for our
earlier analysis of addressing potentially important issues that were assumed away within the
basic model including rent seeking/marketing, horizontal differentiation and general equilibrium
considerations. Section 5 concludes the paper and identifies issues for future investigation.
2 Simple Model
In this section we outline a simple framework for illustrating the possible sources of welfare gains
arising from the implementation of the new patent purchase policy proposal in the context of
the pharmaceutical industry over a one-shot drug life-cycle under some stylised assumptions.4
The game has three players (in addition to Nature): a welfare maximising World Govern-
ment,WG, and two profit-maximising multinational pharmaceutical companies, Fi (i ∈ {1, 2}).
We assume thatWG is the only government in the jurisdiction that these firms are operating in.
In reality, many firms operate across multiple jurisdictions, so one way to interpret this model
would be to think of this government as a “world government” with the exclusive authority to
control the patenting of pharmaceuticals globally. All players are risk neutral. The game is one
of complete and full information.5 For simplicity there are no production costs and there is no
4The concept of “patent” used in this paper has elements of both the patent and the licence in actual drug
policy. Patents for medicines are usually applied for and awarded early on during the R&D process, long
before the product is licensed with a marking authorisation. Because the typical licence is applied for after the
completion of the R&D process, the “patent” in this paper may appear similar to these. However, since licences
can be awarded to more than one drug to cover a given medical need, a licence does not give the producer any
exclusive right. The paper does not address the case of multiple indications.
5So, all three players know: everybody else’s objective function; what moves they have made; if either firm
has won; and the quality of the drug. But of course nobody knows who will be assigned by Nature to complete
the drug first.
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discounting.
Assumption 1. Patent policy is set by a World Government (WG).
WG has action set {A,B}. Policy A is what we stylise as the Laissez Faire case where (i)
all successful innovations are awarded patents and (ii) firms are free to set prices. We will later
refine this scenario. Policy B is the Patent Purchase case in which (i) a patent is awarded only
to the winning firm, (ii) the winning firm’s patent is purchased by the WG, (iii) the “prize”
for the winning firm is paid on a “pay-as-you-go” basis in line with sales, (iv) the patented
drug is priced to maximise social welfare subject to covering the compensation to the winning
firm with WG producing the drug or licensing production and recouping the revenue. We will
consider various forms of compensation for the winning firm but it is important to note that
unlike other studies in this area we are not concerned with finding a single welfare maximising
compensation rule. Rather we are concerned with showing there are a range of possible ways of
compensating firms under policy B which are consistent with non-trivial welfare improvement
and, most importantly, taking into account a partial equilibrium life-cycle (excluding wider
welfare benefits) view of costs and benefits associated with the drug. In practice, the WG will
have in mind some overall maximising objective and on a case-by-case basis will compare the
merits of policy A and B in best achieving this - it is not intended that patent purchase be
applied automatically to all new drugs.
The game is played over three time periods with each period lasting Tk (k ∈ {1, 2, 3}). The
length of each period is assumed to be exogenously determined, which may seem unrealistic as
we move between policy A and B: we return to this issue in the final discussion, Section 4. In
the first period two firms compete to develop a new drug, X, each incurring an R&D cost of c
per unit time.
Assumption 2. Firm cost per unit time for R&D expenditures, c, is constant and determined
exogenously.
This assumption is based on the “stylised fact” that pharmaceutical firms invest in R&D at
a fixed rate per period representing maximum capacity. Given Assumption 2 each firm incurs
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an R&D cost of cT1 for period 1. At the end of period 1 Nature determines which firm wins
the race with firm i winning with probability 12 .
6’7 Hence, period 1 ends when one of the firms
succeeds with the development of X and is awarded a patent.8 For convenience we label the
winning firm, w, and the laggard or runner-up firm, r.9 Under the Laisse Faire policy, A, the
winning firm enjoys a monopoly for the duration of period 2, whilst the laggard firm, should
they continue to undertake R&D in an attempt to develop the new drug, continues to incur
the cost c per unit time. Period 2 under policy A ends when the laggard firm is successful in
developing the new drug X and is awarded a patent.10 Under policy A in period 3 the two
firms co-exist as suppliers in the market for the new drug. Period 3 ends when the new drug
becomes obsolete due to the development of (the first of) a new class of drug, X+, ending the
life-cycle of drug X.11
6We explicitly rule out the possibility of the race being tied. After all, if two firms apply for a patent at
the same time WG can select that which is most promising based upon the trials data. We later consider the
possibility that the probability of winning may tend over period 1, through the random research process, to
favour one firm and the implications of this for the incentives at play and consequent gains to policy B over
policy A.
7Within this framework one may question whether large companies have an advantage over smaller companies
and as such that there are different probabilities of winning from the outset depending on size. In reality one
sees many small companies come out as winners in the development process such as Gilead with their hepatitis
C drug and Celgene with their blood cancer drug. One may also refer to a number of biotechnology companies
who have been successful in beating “big Pharma” such as in the launch of new products (e.g. Centocor with
Centoxin and ReoPro). The advantages of “big Pharma” may be more prevalent after launch, with significant
economies of scale when introducing a new agent to the market which explains why Centocor is now part of
Johnson & Johnson. Alternatively one may refer to the rise of Celgene, now a global company, who entered the
market only 30 years ago and who made a number of acquisitions of even smaller companies on their way to
their current size.
8In practice, the success of drug development is not reached at one specific point in time - there are a number
of incremental milestones to clear. Indeed, important and non-trivial R&D and dissemination efforts often take
place after a patent has been awarded - however, in our model we let all relevant R&D and dissemination
costs be included under T1 for the winning firm. Hence we are imposing an artificial on/off concept of drug
development. At any point in time during (except at the end of period 1) both firms have no finished product
{0, 0}, and then at the end of T1 it is {1, 0}.
9Runner-up or laggard firm drugs are also called “me-too”.
10As with the winning firm, the end of the research period for the laggard firm includes all relevant R&D,
some of which in practice occurs after the patent is awarded.
11This is a simplifying assumption, since the winning firm’s patent could expire before obsolescence. However,
we rule out the inclusion of a further period, T4, which would arise under these circumstances on the basis that
it adds insufficient additional insight to justify the additional modelling considerations. First, the outcome in
period T4 under our modelling assumptions would likely be very similar under policies A and B. Once the
winning firm’s patent expires, which happens at the same time under policy A and B (as does the obsolescence
of X by assumption), the only difference between policy A and B is that under the former there is a laggard
firm with a “live” patent for its version of drug X. However, this is not likely to be of any consequence for
the market for X as new entrants can freely use the winning firm’s technology which is no longer protected
by a “live” patent under either policy A or B and so the incentives to enter and their impact on market price
are unlikely to differ in T4 under policy A relative to B. Second, the relevant patent period is 20 years, and
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Assumption 3. Under policy A in period 3 the laggard firm adopts the prevailing “catalogue”
price for drug X, set by the winning firm in period 2, upon joining the market.
Assumption 3 removes any price competition in the market for the new drug under policy
A with firms implicitly colluding to maintain the prevailing monopoly price. Although this
is a strong assumption, we argue that it might not be too irregular in the pharmaceutical
industry. Weak price competition in the context of pharmaceuticals has been recognised as a
symptom of the special nature of the industry, where often the end users (the patients) are not
the ones either paying for the treatments or making choices about treatment selection (e.g.,
DiMasi and Paquette, 2004; Lee, 2004). Further support for this argument regarding weak price
competition is provided by evidence that, typically, drugs offering “little or no therapeutic gain”
were introduced in the U.S. at prices in line with existing drugs in the U.S. and roughly double
the price of existing drugs in Sweden (see Lu and Comanor, 1998; Ekelund and Persson, 2003).
Indeed, the sequential nature of the arrival of firms in the market lends some support to the idea
of the adoption of the prevailing price - whereby the prevailing price acts as a focal point for
the laggard firm. Also, many countries, such as the Netherlands, have reimbursement limits for
classes of drugs. Whenever a new drug comes available within such a class, they get reimbursed
against the same price as the first within that class. Finally, a common line of argument in the
pharmaceutical industry is that firms spend heavily on advertising to differentiate their brand
(we return to this issue in Section 4), where in reality the differences between rival drugs are
often minimal, which can weaken price competition. In practice, one finds drugs which are
called “first in class”: these are the winners in the typical situation which is modelled here.
One might call Simvastatin the “first in class” of the statins in the sense that it was the first to
show effects on the incidence of myocardial infarction and survival, which resulted in a major
advantage over other statins and giving them an enormous boost in sales. Later stains, which
showed similar effects, such as Pravastatin, were priced in the same bracket as Simvastatin,
although we assume a zero discount rate for simplicity, in practice any differences between the two policies,
which are already likely to be small, are going to be further diminished by time. (The issue of patent length was
put in the agenda for international debate in the Uruguay round (1986-94) initiated by the Dunkel Draft (see
Chowdhry and Aggarwal, 1994). The Dunkel Draft proposed a patent period of 20 years for both the process
and the product directly obtained through the process. This was finally accepted in the Final Act of 1994.)
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did not try to compete on price. Other products like Atorvastatin, which entered the market
with evidence that it could lower cholesterol more effectively but no data on survival, was also
priced on parity. Another example is Infliximab - first in class of the anti TNF-α drugs to treat
rheumatoid arthritis. Later agents such as adalimumab and golimumab were priced similarly, if
not higher, claiming slightly better efficacy. The so-called new oral anticoagulants rivaroxaban,
apixaban and dabigatran, which have efficacy in stroke prevention, atrial defibrillation and
acute coronary syndrome, provide a further example. Again one finds similar prices for all
three agents and the idea that these drugs are interchangeable is confirmed by a recent meta-
analysis pooling those drugs - and not treating them as unique entities - against warfarin.
The story under the patent purchase policy, B, departs from that outlined under policy A,
above, in two important ways. First, at the end of period 1, the winning firm’s drug is patented
and the patent is purchased by WG but the laggard firm has no incentive to continue its R&D
effort towards the development of drug X, since it will not be able to have its drug patented
and gain any associated reward. Recalling that firms incur constant cost per unit time for R&D
effort, once the new drug has been developed by the winning firm, these R&D expenditures are
diverted to the development of other drugs or towards making X obsolete which we assume
is not achieved by building on R&D to improve upon X marginally - in the sense that a firm
has to first develop its own version of X before moving to discover X+.12 Hence in relation
to the costs and benefits associated with the development and consumption of drug X, under
policy B there are no period 2 R&D costs. (Whilst we will return to this issue in our later
discussion in Section 4, the formal model is concerned only with partial equilibrium costs and
benefits relating directly to the development and consumption - in the life-cycle - of the drug,
X.) Second, under policy B, whilst the winning firm’s drug is now the sole drug on the market
12This may not be such an extreme assumption especially in the context of the pharmaceutical industry.
First, with the granting of the winning firm’s patent comes the disclosure of the details of the new technology
- this is in the public domain and available for all firms as a basis for beginning any sequential efforts towards
discovering drug X+ which makes X obsolete. Second, whilst this is true of all patents, in the pharmaceutical
industry a significant proportion of the R&D time and cost associated with drug development is devoted to
clinical trials. Unless the laggard firm’s trials elicit new information towards the development of X+ during
T2 then both arguments suggest there will be resource gains from ceasing laggard R&D efforts towards its own
“discovery” of X. In the case that any laggard’s trials in T1 suggest they might be close to discovering X+
this can be picked up by the WG or raised with them by the laggard and taken into consideration before the
winning firm’s drug X is patented and patent purchase policy B applied.
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for both periods 2 and 3, the price is determined by WG rather than the winning firm.13
Having outlined the policy options available to WG in this paper we now set out the costs
and rewards of the game. We adopt a simple quasi-linear (justifying a partial equilibrium
analysis) quadratic utility function:
U(x, I) = α
β
x− 12βx
2 + I, (1)
where x is the quantity of the new drug X, I represents expenditure on ‘other’ goods and α, β >
0. Throughout the paper, we will be interested in drawing welfare conclusions. Welfare is the
sum of profit and consumer surplus at a given set of prices. Given the utility function is quasi-
linear, consumer surplus, CS, is a valid measure of welfare, where CS(x, I) = U(x, I)−R(x)−I
and R(x) is firm revenue. Welfare, W , is therefore W = CS + R(x) − TC, where TC is total
costs across the firms, hence :
W (x, I, TC) = U(x, I)− TC − I (2)
Given income M , maximising utility Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint xp + I ≤ M ,
where p is the price of drug X, yields the familiar linear demand function:
x = α− βp (3)
where α and β are positive constants determining the quantity intercept and slope of the
demand curve, respectively.
To summarise, our analysis takes place in a stylised setting with constant R&D expen-
13Whilst under policy B, there is no material difference between what happens in periods 2 and 3 now that
there is no laggard working to catch up and then co-exist in the market with the winner, it is still necessary to
include both periods in the analysis as it is the sum of these periods that represents the total time over which
revenues from the sale of drug X are received. Under policy B, period 2 ends when the runner-up firm would
have successfully developed its own drug X had policy A been in place. The end of period 3 (i.e. the arrival
of the “next” drug X+ that makes X obsolete) is assumed to happen at the same time regardless of policy
A or B. Of course, in practice under policy B given that the laggard’s efforts are now diverted from wasteful
duplication to rediscover X, it might be expected to speed up the discovery of X+ some entirely unrelated new
class of drug, Y . We return to this important point in Section 4.
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diture per unit time, a world government, an on/off conceptualisation of drug development
with exogenous life cycle periods, fully wasteful laggard period 2 R&D towards developing X,
“pay-as-you-go” policy B prize payments tied to sales on a revenue-neutral basis, no price com-
petition, zero discounting and zero production costs. Some of these assumptions we believe
have some basis in the pharmaceutical sector as we have explained above, whilst others are
simplifying assumptions for modelling expedience. Finally, from Eq. (3), drug X is effectively
an homogeneous good whether it is produced by firm 1 or firm 2 (any differences that may
exist between the two firms’ drugs are insignificant in the eyes of the purchaser of drugs - who
may not be the end user). This latter modelling assumption may at first seem odd, since in
this game both firms require their technologies to be patented in order to enter the market and
two firms should not be able to simultaneously hold patients for the same drug. However, for
some time now it has been recognised that the issuing of low quality patents (those where the
innovation does not meet the Patent Office’s statutory patentability requirements, including
novelty) is not uncommon. With Patent Offices often overloaded with patent applications there
is inadequate resource for proper consideration of the application and thorough search of prior
art (see for instance, Shapiro, 2000; Bessen and Maskin, 2007). The assumption also fits well
with a common perception of the pharmaceutical industry, that runner up drugs often show
very little meaningful improvement on the winning drug (e.g. Lee, 2004).
Beginning with policy A, having incurred R&D costs of cT1, the winning firm enjoys a
monopoly for the duration of period 2. Assuming away production costs, profit per unit time
in period 2 is given by pi = (α − βp)p. Maximising profit with respect to price yields the
monopoly price, pm = α2β , and profit per unit time, pi
m = α24β . For simplicity there is no time
discounting and the competitive rate of return is assumed to be zero. The costs, revenues and
welfare incurred in each time period under policy A are set out in Table 1(a).
Under Policy A the winning firm sets price pm in period 2 and this is adopted by the laggard
in period 3, hence profit over the life cycle of drug X for the winner (w) and laggard (r), with
12
Table 1: Profit and welfare by time period Tk (k ∈ {1, 2, 3}) under policy A and
policy B with full and maximal compensation
Period
T1 T2 T3
(a) Policy A
piAw(k) −cT1 α
2
4βT2
α2
8βT3
piAr (k) −cT1 −cT2 α
2
8βT3
WA(k) −2cT1
[
3α2
8β − c
]
T2
3α2
8β T3
(b) Policy Bf
piBfw(k) −cT1 α
2
4βT2
α2
8βT3
piBfr(k) −cT1 0 0
WBf (k) −2cT1 α
2
8βΩf {4− Ωf}T2 α
2
8βΩf {4− Ωf}T3
(c) Policy Bmax
piBmax,w(k) −cT1 14
[
α2
β − cT2(T2+T3)
]
T2
1
4
[
α2
β − cT2(T2+T3)
]
T3
piBmax,r(k) −cT1 0 0
WBmax(k) −2cT1 Ωmax2β
[
α− Ωmax4
]
T2
Ωmax
2β
[
α− Ωmax4
]
T3
Key: Ωf ≡
[
1 +
(
T3
2(T2+T3)
)0.5]; Ωmax ≡ [α+ β ( cT2β(T2+T3))0.5]
profits in period 3 shared evenly, are, respectively:
piAw =
α2
8β [2T2 + T3]− cT1, pi
A
r =
α2
8βT3 − c[T1 + T2] (4)
Aggregate profit, consumer surplus and welfare under Policy A are then, respectively:
piA = α
2
4β [T2 +T3]− c[2T1 +T2], CS
A = α
2
8β (T2 +T3), W
A = 3α
2
8β (T2 +T3)− c[2T1 +T2] (5)
Lemma 1. (i) Under Policy A, having sunk cT1 in the first period of the patent race for X,
the losing firm will only continue R&D towards developing X in period 2 if:
α2
8βT3 > cT2 (6)
(ii) Further, if policy A is to be sustainable over time, it must be the case that the expected
aggregate profit, piA, be non-negative, hence:
T1 ≤ α
2
8cβ [T2 + T3]−
1
2T2 (7)
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For our analysis comparing the costs and benefits under policy A and B to be valid, we
require both conditions in Lemma 1 to hold.
Turning to policy B, in order to determine the levels and distribution of surpluses across
firms and consumers it is necessary to specify the rules governing the compensation to the
winning firm and the pricing strategy ofWG. Regarding the latter, we assume a budget neutral
policy so that the revenue from the sale of the drug by WG exactly pays for the compensation
to the winning firm: there are no transfers from elsewhere in the economy to run policy B.14
Regarding compensation, we begin with a rule which we label “full” compensation, Cf . We
label policy B with this compensation rule, Bf . This rule is not cost-based (its implementation
requires only information about what the monopoly price would have been) and seeks to fully
compensate the winner in the one-shot patent race for X (this compensation leaves the winner
with exactly the same overall reward under policy B that they would have gained as the winner
under policy A):
Cf ≡ α
2
8β [2T2 + T3] (8)
Under this compensation rule the expected profit of a firm beginning the one-shot game
is lower than under policy A. However, the expected profit for a firm approaches that under
policy A from below as the probability of winning increases from 12 towards 1 which we might
expect to happen as one firm takes a lead over the period T1, as we discuss later.
Next, we introduce a compensation rule which ensures that the expected profit under policy
B is the same for each firm at the start of period T1 as under policy A ensuring that each firm -
who over time (in repeated plays of the game) expects to win as many races as they lose given
the probability of winning the period 1 race is 12 - can be compensated for having no reward in
the cases they lose with the prizes they obtain in the races they win.15 We label policy B with
14The budget neutrality assumption is not essential, and we discuss relaxing it in Section 4. However, it does
aid the assumption of a unified WG in terms of reducing the possible incentives of regional jurisdictions within
WG trying to free ride or opt out of the policy due to the need to share the funding of policy B.
15Of course, this is only illustrative and for simplicity this repeated game idea is undertaken making the
simplifying assumption that all successful drug developments have the same cost and reward profiles. In practice,
reward profiles for drugs will vary from case to case as will the number and identity of the players in each game.
Indeed, firms must be compensated not only for drug development races that they might lose but also those
that are unsuccessful in that they do not result in a viable product. However, we can just assume the latter is
covered by the period 1 cost of developing X i.e. cT1 includes the costs of all the failed R&D efforts or dead
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this compensation rule, Bmax. Assuming that WG does not permit compensation beyond the
aggregate amount available to the firms under policy A, this then is the maximal compensation,
which we call “maximal” or “incentive neutral” compensation, Cmax ≡ α24β [T2 + T3] − cT2, in
which all the profit that would have accrued to the winning and laggard firm under policy A
are paid to the winning firm under policy B. Under “maximal” compensation, the winning
firm receives a payment Cmax, and break-even requires that the price p˜max charged for the drug
generates revenue that exactly covers this payment, hence:
p˜max(α− βp˜max)[T2 + T3] = α
2
4β [T2 + T3]− cT2 (9)
Minimising pmax subject to achieving the break-even constraint, Eq. (9):
p˜max =
α
2β −
1
2
(
cT2
b(T2 + T3)
)0.5
(10)
Profits and welfare accruing per period under policy B with maximal compensation are reported
in Table 1(c). We have labelled this compensation rule under policy B “incentive neutral” since
the expected profit for each firm over repeated plays of the game is exactly the same as under
policy A and hence we would not expect it to yield any incentives to vary from R&D intensity
relative to that in the benchmark case of policy A. Whilst we have assumed away any incentive
effects on R&D in this Section we will return to this issue in Section 4.
There are many possible compensation rules that can be justified, with and without the
break-even constraint we impose, but for modelling expedience there is a need to have a cut
off point. Suppose WG wants to avoid expected profit for either firm at the outset of the one-
shot game being negative. This principle defines “minimal” compensation Cmin ≡ 2cT1, which
exactly covers the expected cost to a firm from competing in the development of new drugs
over time (see Eq. 7).16 This reasoning results in the following closed interval of compensation
ends visited on the way to developing X.
16On average a firm can expect to win one patent race and lose a patent race in fixed proportions hence the
payment 2cT1 exactly covers the expenditure of one successful and one unsuccessful patent race for a firm.
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payments:17 [
2cT1,
α2
4β [T2 + T3]− cT2
]
(11)
We now consider some properties of the compensation rules we have introduced.
Proposition 1. 18 Under policy B with “maximal” compensation (Cmax), the break-even price,
p˜max, is strictly lower, and consumer surplus and welfare are strictly higher, than under policy
A.
What this serves to illustrate is that even under the most generous of the compensation
rules that we consider (and ignoring potentially significant general equilibrium benefits of policy
B), which on average entirely compensates the firms for profits they would have experienced
under policy A, welfare and consumer surplus can be improved under policy B. Indeed, as
the Proof illustrates the improvement in welfare comes through two channels, referring to Eq.
(2): directly, through the reduction of costs, and indirectly, through the increase in quantity
associated with the lower break-even price required to restore full expected profit to the firms.
Cmax represents the most generous of the compensatory packages that we consider in this
paper. We now turn attention to the other possible compensations in Eq. (11).
Proposition 2. Under policy B the break-even price p˜ (consumer surplus and welfare) is (are)
strictly increasing (decreasing) with compensation in the interval [Cmin, Cmax).
Corollary 1. If firms’ R&D investment efforts are determined exogenously and are not incen-
tive driven (i.e. not a function of expected profits), as we have so far assumed, then welfare is
maximised under Cmin.
Corollary 1 highlights an important point. We have assumed that the intervals Tk and
the intensity of R&D are exogenous. Yet, in practice as we reduce the compensation below
the maximal level this may reduce R&D effort potentially offsetting some of the gains from
17As we will discuss later there may be arguments as to why a compensation greater than Cmax (although
here we treat R&D intensity as a constant and so do not capture any possible associated benefits from this in
our model) and less than Cmin might be suitable. Indeed, compensation Cf will, under some circumstances lie
outside this interval. This need not be a problem at all but we will wish to know where this may happens in
order to understand the possible trade-offs involved.
18Proofs to propositions are reported in the Appendix.
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the increased surplus associated with the lower break-even price for X. Of course, there are
also obvious problems with compensation that is cost-based (Cmin): firms have an incentive to
inflate the costs of their R&D to exploit the payment rule 2cT1. However, Cmin and Cmax have
been identified as limit cases consistent with a set of objectives and are not necessarily being
recommended as effective compensation rules. Recall though, Cf is not cost-based.
Lemma 2. “Full” compensation is strictly smaller than “maximal” compensation, Cmax > Cf ,
but may be bigger or smaller than “minimal” compensation. A sufficient condition for Cf ≥
Cmin is:
cT1 ≤ α
2
8β [T2 +
1
2cT3] (12)
If the condition in Lemma 2 is met then “full” compensation under policy B is consistent
with our tentative requirement that over time, in repeated patent competitions, firms under
policy B should expect to at least break even.19 Under full compensation, the winning firm
receives a payment Cf , and break-even requires that the price p˜f charged for the drug generates
revenue that exactly covers this payment, hence:
p˜f (α− βp˜f )[T2 + T3] = α
2
8β [2T2 + T3] (13)
Minimising p˜f subject to the constraint, (13):
p˜f =
α
2β
1− ( T32(T2 + T3)
)0.5 (14)
Per period profit and welfare under policy B with compensation Cf are reported in Table 1(b).
We now consider the relative gains and losses under policy B with “full” compensation
relative to policy A.
Proposition 3. Aggregate (or expected) profit under policy B with “full” compensation is
19Though we will be interested throughout to see whether the conditions of Lemma 2 are met we will later see
that this condition may be too restrictive since under policy B laggard firms may not in practice incur all of the
development costs in period 1 cT1 that they would have under policy A, and hence the required remuneration
under policy B may be smaller than we assume here.
17
strictly lower than aggregate (or expected) profit under policy A: piBf < piA.
Since we have placed the restriction (in Lemma 1) that entering in to period 2 R&D for
the laggard firm must have a positive expected return under policy A, it must be the case that
aggregate profit under policy B with compensation Cf is strictly lower than under policy A.
Proposition 4. Welfare and consumer surplus under policy B with “full” and “maximal”
compensation are strictly increasing in T2 and T3.
Welfare improves under policy B relative to A because wasteful duplicative R&D costs are
avoided in period 2 and price is lower across periods 2 and 3. The longer is T2 +T3, the greater
is the time over which the price-reduction is enjoyed. Further, the longer is period 2 the greater
is the extent of wasteful duplicative R&D under policy A and hence the greater the gain from
policy B. The benefits from policy B are higher in situations where the laggard is a long way
behind the winner (T2 is long) and the market life of the drug is long.
3 Simulations
In order to get some idea about the potential magnitude of the partial equilibrium, one-shot
gains to welfare under policy B, we now undertake some simulations, employing cases Bf and
Bmax, whereby it becomes necessary to make some further simplifying assumptions.20 We
begin by setting α, β = 1, reducing demand, Eq. (3), to the unit linear form, x = 1 − p.
Next, we will assume that the time taken to develop a new technology for the winning firm is,
T1 ∈ {0.75, 1.50}, and that the period of time the firm(s) are able to enjoy the patent before it
becomes obsolete is T2+T3 = 1.5.21 We specify three parameterisations of T2 ∈ {0.10, 0.50, 0.75}
with the foremost representing a laggard who is very close behind in the patent race and the
20It is important to note that simulations reported in the Tables cannot be given comparative static interpre-
tation - that is changes in the value of the welfare gain with a higher level of a parameter cannot be used to infer
the comparative static for the welfare gain in relation to that parameter. This is because the simulations are
bound by underlying assumptions which, for instance, keep rates of return constant with varying realisations of
other parameters.
21These parameterisations allow us to model scenarios in which the development period for X is smaller or
equal to the market life of the drug. With the patent period of 20 years as an upper limit on the time period
T2 + T3 we can see that setting T1 at 0.75 and 1.5 implies maximum development times of 10 to 20 years,
respectively
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last, a laggard that is a significant way behind. Hence, aggregate profit under policy A (based
on Eq. (5)) is piA = 38 − c[2T1 + T2]. Finally, we let the expected rate of return for a firm take
the values ρ ∈ {10%, 20%, 50%}. Hence, c = 38(1+ρ)[2T1+T2] . Table 2 reports our simulations.
Table 2: Percentage gain in welfare under policy B with “full” and “maximal”
compensation relative to policy A
T1 = 0.75 T1 = 1.50
T2 T2
0.10 0.50 0.75 0.10 0.50 0.75
(a) Policy Bf 0.1 86.1 † 110.4 † 119.4 † 81.4 † 93.9 † 98.9 †
ρ 0.2 75.6 † 95.0 102.1 71.8 † 81.6 † 85.4
0.5 59.2 71.0 75.0 56.8 † 62.4 64.3
(b) Policy Bmax 0.1 38.9 87.5 118.8 31.5 72.0 87.5
ρ 0.2 32.9 73.7 99.9 26.6 60.7 73.7
0.5 23.3 51.8 69.9 18.9 42.7 51.8
Key: † denotes when Cf < Cmin
It is clear from the Table that the percentage gains from full and maximal compensation are
large across the parameter selection. For instance, with T1 = 0.75, T2 = 0.5 and the expected
rate of return ρ under policy A at 20%, the gains under policy B relative to A with maximal and
full compensation are, respectively 74% and 95%, adding close to three-quarters or doubling
welfare under policy B.
However, there are cases, indicated by “†” where policy B with full compensation does not
meet the requirement that Cf ≥ Cmin.22 This may or may not be important (see Section 4.3).
Our results in this Section are based on very simplifying assumptions and in the next Section
we see how these figures hold up as we take in to account other factors of potential importance.
4 Further issues
In this Section we relax in turn each of five key assumptions to see how the gains from policy
B identified in Section 3 stand up.
22Note that the two conditions in Lemma 1 are met for all the parameterisations in Table 2. That is to say,
all the reported outcomes are consistent with sustainability of the game under policy A and the laggard firm
optimally continuing R&D expenditures towards developing drug X in period 2 under policy A.
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4.1 Marketing
It has been argued in the literature that a large part of the costs incurred by pharmaceutical
firms are made up of marketing, to provide information/ dissemination but also to differentiate
their product from rivals. In this model we include all informational/disseminational marketing
costs under cT1 for the winning firm and c(T1 + T2) for the laggard under policy A. However,
if we augment our model so that the coexistence of firms in period 3 under policy A induces
marketing competition - inflating firm costs but offering no informational value (since the goods
are effectively perfect substitutes) - then this would further enhance the welfare gains under
policy B. Again, welfare in Eq. (2) is increasing in x and decreasing in costs. Hence, policy
B, by eliminating the co-existence of firms in period 3 would increase welfare (i) directly, by
eliminating wasteful marketing costs, and (ii) indirectly, by reducing the revenue (and break-
even price) needed to compensate the winning firm, raising quantity and thereby welfare. As
such, policy B, in addition to reducing wasteful duplicative R&D, would also correct the incen-
tive mechanism that leads to wasteful marketing expenditures under policy A. Repeating the
analysis of the welfare gains from policy B assuming policy A results in wasteful R&D with
marketing expenditures per firm of 15% of the period 3 sales revenue, leads to the welfare gains
reported in Table 3.23
Table 3: Percentage gain in welfare under policy B with “full” and “maximal”
compensation relative to policy A with wasteful period 3 marketing under policy
A of 15% of period 3 revenue
T1 = 0.75 T1 = 1.5
T2 T2
0.10 0.50 0.75 0.10 0.50 0.75
(a) Policy Bf 0.1 139.7 † 167.1 † 175.1 † 133.6 † 146.7 † 150.7 †
ρ 0.2 118.6 † 140.8 † 147.5 113.8 † 124.7 † 128.1 †
0.5 88.5 † ‡ ‡ 85.6 † †‡ ‡
(b) Policy Bmax 0.1 112.7 129.4 132.0 106.6 109.0 107.6
ρ 0.2 95.5 108.3 110.1 90.7 92.2 90.7
0.5 71.0 ‡ ‡ 68.1 ‡ ‡
Key: † denotes when Cf < Cmin; ‡ denotes when condition Lemma 1(i) is not met.
23Estimates have placed marketing expenditures at between 15% (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association,
1988) and 22% of sales (Ballance et al., 1992). Hence, our figure of 15% is not the maximum justifiable on this
basis, and against the latter leaves some room to accommodate elements of period 3 marketing that might have
informational value.
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It is clear from comparison of Tables 3 and 2 that taking into account possible wasteful
marketing distortions results in notable increases in the potential gains to policy B. Note in
particular the improvement in the gains under maximal compensation.24 For instance, with
T1 = 0.75, T2 = 0.5 and the expected rate of return ρ under policy A at 20%, the gains under
policy B relative to A with full (maximal) compensation increase from those with no wasteful
marketing, in Table 2, from 95% to 141% (74% to 108%).
4.2 Multi-firm R&D competition and Product Differentiation
So far we have assumed that there are two rival firms competing in an R&D race to develop the
drug, X. In practice, in any single pharmaceutical patent race there can be several firms. We
are now going to look at the gains to policy B where the number of rival firms exceeds 2. In
the case of a homogenous drug X, the benefits of policy B quickly mount up with the inclusion
of more firms - for whom, so long as period 3 revenues offset the period 1 and 2 R&D costs -
will optimally select to undertake duplicative and wasteful research. Hence, at this stage we
allow for firms’ drugs to have some degree of horizontal differentiation so we can examine the
trade-offs of policy B where rejecting runner up drugs which have genuine value-added has a
downward effect on welfare. As before, we assume an absence of price competition in period 3
under policy A with the winner succeeding at the end of period 1 and the n−1 runner up firms
catching up simultaneously at the end of period 2. Let utility take the simple quasi-linear form
(e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984):
U(x, I) =
n∑
i=1
xi − 12
 n∑
i=1
x2i + 2γ
∑
i 6=j
xixj
+ I,
which yields the following horizontally differentiated demands for firm i:
xi = Ψ−1[1− γ − (1 + γ(n− 2))pi + γ
∑
j 6=i
pj]
24Entries with ‡ are not reported since under these parameterisations, the laggard under policy A would not
continue to period 2 R&D.
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where Ψ ≡ (1− γ)(1 + γ(n− 1)) and γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of substitutability of drug
i with respect to drug j. The drugs are perfect substitutes (unrelated) under γ = 1 (γ = 0). x
is an n-vector of demands for each of the firms’ horizontally differentiated drugs, Xi.25 Under
policy A in period 2 the winning firm, w, sets price equal to pm and earns profit pim per unit
time as there are no rival drugs on the market (γ is effectively zero in period 2 for the winning
firm). In period 3 the n− 1 rival firms have caught up and placed their variants of the winning
drug on the market.26 We assume that they adopt the price that would prevail under joint
profit maximisation, pmi , with associated output, xmi ,respectively:
pmi =
1− γ
2 + γ(n− 3) < p
m, xmi =
1 + γ(n− 2)
(1 + γ(n− 1))(2 + γ(n− 3))
Welfare under policy A is then:27
WA(n) = 38T2 +
[
nxmi −
1
2
(
n(xmi )2 + 2γ
n(n− 1)
2 (x
m
i )2
)]
T3 − ncT1 − (n− 1)cT2
Under policy B, the n − 1 rival firms are denied access to the market in period 3 and hence
have no incentive to continue period 2 R&D investments towards developing drug Xr (r 6= w =
1, ..., n). Under policy Bf the winning firm is compensated with Cf (n) = xmpmT2 + xmi pmi T3
but with only one drug on the market, using Eq. 3, the break-even price and welfare are then,
respectively:
p˜f (n) =
1
2
1− (1− 4Cf (n)
T2 + T3
)0.5 , WBf (n) = x˜f (n)− 12 x˜f (n)2 − ncT1 (15)
where x˜f (n) = 1 − p˜f (n). To illustrate that policy B under full compensation can still offer
welfare gains over policy A, where policy B prevents the arrival in period 3 of firms producing
differentiated goods and hence add genuine value, consider Figure 1.
25This differentiation can be thought of in the context that drug Xi might not work 100% of the time for 100%
of patients, so the different variants Xj of the same drug might work for different patients, or have different
side effects.
26For simplicity, we assume that no privilege is given to the winning firm.
27In equilibrium,
∑
i 6=j xixj =
n(n−1)
2 (xmi )2, given the sum of integers from 1 to n− 1 is given by n(n−1)2 .
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Figure 1: Ratio of Welfare under Policy Bf to Policy A with degree of substi-
tutability γ
Key: n = 2 solid line; n = 3 longdash; n = 4 dots
Whilst in Figure 1 we maintain our earlier modelling assumptions determining c and T3
(see Section 3), in order to ensure that we have interior solutions (also satisfying the conditions
in Lemma 1), whilst at the same time not disfavouring the viability of multiple firms, we set
T1 = 0.75, T2 = 0.1 and ρ = 0.75.28 The high rate of return is required to allow multiple firms
to exist profitably in period 3 within our modelling set up whilst the short time periods reduce
the penalty for multiple firms’ R&D efforts under policy A. What this figure shows is that, in
the relevant range, the welfare gains from policy Bf are upwards of 30%, despite the fact that
this policy denies entry into the market of 2 to 3 additional drugs that would have added value.
This happens for two reasons. First, the additional drugs, though adding value, would have
been charged at the monopoly price so that the full benefits of these drugs would not have fully
permeated through to the end users. Second, there are additional R&D efforts of n− 1 firms in
period 2 under policy A. Even though these R&D efforts are not completely duplicative (indeed
in Figure 1, γ is chosen so it is not close to 1, hence these drugs are not very close substitutes),
the net benefit is lower than under policy Bf which excludes these costs, loses the added value
28Unlike before, we do not seek to satisfy the condition that compensation exceeds the expected costs to
firms in repeated plays of the game under policy B. Whilst this condition is met in the scenario of Figure 1
for n = 2 it is not met for n = 3 or higher. However, without further analysis it is not obvious that it would
be in the interests of welfare maximisation to have so many firms compete for each prize in the first place
with each incurring the period 1 R&D costs. To sustain a higher number of firms on average requires a higher
winning compensation. There is a trade-off between the number of firms needed for an efficient patent race and
duplicated costs incurred of period 1 R&D.
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of multiple differentiated drugs, but, employs a lower (break-even) price.29 As before, given
our modelling assumptions, which tie together per period cost and rate of returns, we cannot
use Figure 1 to make comparative static judgements.
4.3 Early laggard withdrawal under policy B
So far we have assumed that rival firms compete right to the end of period 1 in the hope of
winning the prize under policy B. However, unlike under policy A, where the laggard can
expect to receive some reward so long as they complete their R&D until the end of period 2,
under policy B there is no reward for the losing firm. Hence, not only does the losing firm have
no incentive to continue into period 2 under policy B, if a firm believes it is far enough behind
its rival to the extent that the probability of winning is sufficiently low at some point during
T1, then it may be optimal to exit the race before the end of period 1. In our early discussion
of the phases of clinical trials we saw that there is potentially quite a lot of information in the
public domain during period 1 to inform the firms about where they stand in the race, which
under policy B may be sufficient to yield the early withdrawal of the laggard firm, yielding
additional benefits in welfare.
Under early (in period 1) laggard withdrawal, it is now possible that “full” compensation
can exceed “maximal” compensation.
Proposition 5. With early period 1 laggard withdrawal, “full” compensation will exceed “max-
imal” compensation if:
µ >
α2T3
8βcT1
− T2
T1
where µ ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of period T1 that is left when the laggard firm withdraws from
the patent race.
The benefits of early laggard withdrawal are threefold. First, the laggard does not incur
the full cT1 cost of R&D - directly raising welfare under policy B. Second, the average cost
29Solving for policy Bmax involves time-consuming search for corner solutions but it can also be shown to
have welfare improving capability.
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that a firm expects to incur over multiple plays of the game are smaller, which reduces the
threshold at which Cf compensation exceeds expected costs over time. This may have important
implications for the long-term viability of multiple firms under policy B allowing more to be
sustained under compensation Cf as discussed in the previous section. Finally, if firms are
not pursuing R&D towards discovering drug X then these resources can be directed towards
discovering other new classes of drugs, Y , or making X obsolete discovering X+, which we
would expect to have further benefits and discuss below.
To help illustrate the potential impact of early laggard withdrawal from period 1 R&D, we
reproduce the simulations in Table 2 under the assumption that, under policy B, the laggard
only incurs cT12 before withdrawing from the race. Note that welfare under policy B will be
increased directly due to the fall in R&D costs of cT12 in the one-shot game, but also if early
withdrawal in this way were the norm under policy B then Cmax and Cmin would also fall due
to the lower average expected cost of engagement in each patent race.30 The compensation and
price under “full” compensation are unchanged.
Table 4: Percentage gain in welfare under policy B with “full” and “maximal”
compensation relative to policy A with early laggard period 1 withdrawal (µ =
0.5)
T1 = 0.75 T1 = 1.50
T2 T2
0.10 0.50 0.75 0.10 0.50 0.75
(a) Policy B(f) 0.1 122.1 † 139.2 † 145.1 118.6 † 126.8 † 129.7
ρ 0.2 104.9 118.4 122.9 102.0 108.4 110.4
0.5 78.0 86.0 88.3 76.1 79.6 80.3
(b) Policy B(max) 0.1 110.8 140.4 152.6 105.6 123.9 132.8
ρ 0.2 93.2 117.9 128.1 88.8 104.2 111.6
0.5 65.3 82.3 89.3 62.3 72.8 78.0
Key: † denotes when Cf < Cmin
Comparison of Tables 4 and 2 show that the early laggard withdrawal can add significantly to
the welfare gains under policy B. For instance, with T1 = 0.75, T2 = 0.5 and the expected rate
of return ρ under policy A at 20%, the gains under policy B relative to A with full (maximal)
compensation increase from those with no early withdrawal, in Table 2, from 95% to 118%
30Specifically, Cmin ≡ 32cT1 and p˜max ≡ 12
[
α
β −
(
c(2T2+T1)
2β(T2+T3)
)0.5]
.
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(74% to 118%). Notably, in line with Proposition 5, welfare under “maximal” compensation
may now exceed that under “full” compensation. This is because the former seeks to match the
expected profit to each firm under repeated plays of the game but the under early withdrawal
of the laggard in period 1 the required compensation falls below that required under “full”
compensation which only focusses on matching the one-shot rewards for the winner under
policies A and B.
4.4 Period 3 competition
As discussed above, there is much evidence to suggest that price competition does not result in
period 3 of the drug life-cycle in many cases. Accordingly, we have assumed thus far that the
arrival of the laggard in period 3 under policy A leads to the adoption of the prevailing price
and hence sharing of monopoly profits. We now briefly consider the implications of relaxing
this assumption in favour of (softer) period 3 Cournot quantity competition.
Under our simulation assumptions (as outlined in Section 3), the winning firm’s profit and
aggregate profit under policy A with period 3 Cournot competition are, respectively, piA(C)w =
T3
9 +
T2
4 − c[T1] and piA(C) = 2T39 + T24 − c[2T1 + T2]. The break-even prices under policy B
with full and maximal compensation are then, respectively, p˜Cf = 12
[
1−
(
5T3
9(T2+T3)
)0.5]
and
p˜Cmax = 12
[
1−
(
T3
9(T2+T3)
)0.5]
.
Reproducing the simulations for the gain in welfare under policy B relative to A:
Table 5: Percentage gain in welfare under policy B with “full” and “maximal”
compensation relative to policy A with period 3 Cournot quantity competition
T1 = 0.75 T1 = 1.5
T2 T2
0.10 0.50 0.75 0.10 0.50 0.75
(a) Policy Bf 0.1 29.9 † 57.1 † 71.3 † 26.7 † 44.9 † 55.4 †
ρ 0.2 27.0 † 50.0 † 61.9 24.2 † 39.8 † 48.6
0.5 21.9 38.0 46.1 20.1 † 31.1 † 37.3
(b) Policy Bmax 0.1 7.6 33.3 46.9 4.4 21.1 31.0
ρ 0.2 6.5 28.02 39.6 3.8 18.0 26.4
0.5 4.5 19.7 27.5 2.7 12.9 18.7
Key: † denotes when Cf < Cmin
From Table 5 it is clear that substantial gains still exist from pursuing policy B even when
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one of our key assumptions, on price rigidity, is relaxed. For instance, with T1 = 0.75, T2 = 0.5
and an expected rate of return under policy A of 20%, the gain under policy B relative to A
with full (maximal) compensation is 50% (28%), reduced from the gains under no period 3
competition with policy A, but still substantial.
4.5 General equilibrium and welfare maximising R&D
So far our analysis of the welfare benefits of policy B relative to A has been undertaken within
the partial-equilibrium one-shot drug life-cycle framework. However, it is clear that there are
potentially important general equilibrium effects associated with such a change in patenting
policy. For instance, eliminating period 2 laggard R&D under policy B may also have benefits
beyond the one-shot partial equilibrium patent game for drug X. Whilst at the end of period
1 the winning firm devotes its full R&D effort to the next best project regardless of the policy,
A or B, under policy A the laggard continues to devote their full effort (wastefully) to drug
X. Under policy B the laggard also switches R&D effort to the next best project at the end
of period 1 as there are no possible rewards for them continuing with this investment in the
development of drug X. This diverted effort may increase the speed at which some unrelated
new class of drug (Y ) is discovered and developed - i.e. count towards the period 1 R&D in
the life-cycle of the new drug Y . In Table 6 we report the percentage gains under policy B
relative to A in the case that the laggard’s period 2 R&D expenditures under policy A, cT2,
are devoted, in policy B, to the development of a new unrelated drug Y , with welfare gains
associated with it on a pro-rata basis to the gains in the one-shot life-cycle for drug X based
on the investment 2cT1. Specifically, let ∇ denote the total welfare under policy B for any
given parameter combination, based on the firms each investing cT1 (these are the basis for the
welfare gains reported in Table 2). Welfare per unit investment is therefore ∇ cT22cT1 . Hence in
the case that laggard period 2 investments under policy A are diverted to the discovery of the
new drug Y , welfare under policy B, on a pro-rata return basis is:
∇
(
1 + cT22cT1
)
(16)
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The figures reported in Table 6 use Eq. 16 as a basis for calculating welfare under policy B.
Table 6: Percentage gain in welfare under policy B with “full” and “maximal”
compensation relative to policy A with pro-rata value added welfare on period
2 R&D
T1 = 0.75 T1 = 1.5
T2 T2
0.10 0.50 0.75 0.10 0.50 0.75
(a) Policy B(f) 0.1 98.5 † 180.5 † 229.2 87.5 † 126.2 † 148.7
ρ 0.2 87.3 160.0 203.1 77.5 111.9 131.8
0.5 69.8 128.0 162.5 62.0 89.5 105.4
(b) Policy B(max) 0.1 54.8 166.5 228.2 35.8 100.6 134.4
ρ 0.2 47.3 145.5 199.8 30.8 87.5 117.2
0.5 35.5 112.0 154.9 22.9 66.5 89.8
Key: † denotes when Cf < Cmin
From Table 6 it is clear that even taking into account this one possible general equilibrium
factor has the potential to significantly boost the welfare gains from policy B relative to policy
A. Comparison of Tables 6 and 2 show that allowing the laggard’s cT2 R&D to be diverted to
alternative projects with the same expected gain in welfare on a pro-rata basis as 2cT1 with
T1 = 0.75, T2 = 0.5 and the expected rate of return ρ under policy A at 20%, the gains under
policy B relative to A with full (maximal) compensation increase, in Table 2, from 95% to
160% (74% to 146%).31
However, given what we have seen earlier about incentives for the laggard to withdraw early
from the period 1 race, the figures in Table 6 may well understate the extent of the gains to
policy B arising from this one general equilibrium dimension: the relevant factor for pro-rata
calculations would be c(µT1+T2)
c(2−µ)T1 >
cT2
2cT1 and the original partial equilibrium welfare gains to be
factored up are ∆ ≥ ∇, where, for any parameter combination, ∆ is the total welfare gain from
policy B reported in Table 4. On the other hand, the picture may be a little more complicated
since the laggard’s diverted cT2 R&D may go towards speeding up the obsolescence of drug X
if the investment goes towards drug X+ thus shortening period 3.32
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, much attention has been given to the reward
31These gains mean appear disproportionate in size given the size of T2 relative to T1. However, to illustrate
where these figures come from, note that under the above parameterisation, WA ≈ 0.333, whilst partial equi-
librium welfare under policy Bf is ∇ ≈ 0.650. From Eq. (16), the general equilibrium calculation of welfare
under Bf is ∇(1 + 1/3) ≈ 1.217, yielding a welfare gain, relative to policy A of roughly 160%.
32The endogeneity of T3 lies beyond the scope of the current paper.
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system in buyouts and their impact on the effectiveness of the policy. Gallini and Scotchmer
(2001) stress the importance of the prize being linked to the social value of the innovation.
Hollis (2004) who offers a detailed discussion of many of the issues surrounding patent buyouts,
suggests an efficient pricing system for pharmaceuticals based on incremental value. Shavell
and van Ypersele (2001) propose a system in which the reward exceeds profit but lies below
the social value of the innovation - thereby having the potential to raise welfare and stimulate
further R&D. In our life-cycle model we have assumed a constant investment rate for R&D
based on an industry stylised fact and backed this up to some extent by choosing compensation
rules which steer towards incentive neutrality on R&D across policies A and B. Hence, we have
explicitly abstracted away from these price incentive considerations. However, the question of
rewarding innovators with compensations close to full surplus achieves its gains through R&D
breakthroughs happening more quickly, for which the subsidies required to fund this need to
be balanced against the gains, where these general equilibrium considerations (in capturing the
increased speed of the introduction of new technologies on to the market over time) play an
essential role.
5 Conclusions & Discussion
The system of rewarding innovations in the pharmaceutical sector is frequently singled out
for criticism on the basis that it tends to exhibit two major failings: (i) innovating firms
have inadequate incentive to focus efforts on developing technologies which make non-trivial
incremental gains, since rewards can be earned from innovations with little incremental value,
and (ii) rates of return remain for long periods at, close to, monopoly levels. There is a small,
but significant, literature which has begun to address these failings, including work exploring
alternative ways of rewarding innovation and estimates of the welfare losses due to the exercise
of monopoly power in the sector. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining the
innovation issue in a one-shot drug life-cycle framework. We study the potential gains in
welfare arising from a policy (B) in which only the winning firm’s drug is patented, the patent
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is purchased by the government and a price for the drug set so as to cover the compensation
to the wining firm. Though the main concern of the paper is not to identify an optimal pricing
rule, we illustrate the benefits of the new policy (B) under two alternative compensation rules:
“full” and “maximal” compensation. The former (latter) exactly compensates the winning firm
in the race for the patent in the one-shot life-cycle of the drug (exactly compensates the firm
over repeated plays of this life-cycle game or, in other words, yields an expected profit to the
firms which is unchanged from that under the original patent policy, A). We show that policy B
yields welfare gains which derive through several sources. First, laggard firms have no incentive
to undertake wasteful duplicative R&D and so the associated costs are avoided. Second, in
the absence of duplicatory costs, the break-even price required to cover (even “maximal”)
compensation for the winning firm, is lower than the price that would have prevailed under
policy A. We produce simulations to show that the extent of the welfare gains arising through
these channels can be substantial. For instance, in the basic model which excludes, amongst
other things, potentially large positive general equilibrium benefits, improvements in welfare of
upwards of 50% exist over a wide range of parameter values.
It is easy to see how our policy proposal would have been relevant for some of the statins,
with simvastatin being the only one being patented and traded. The current PKCS-9 inhibitors,
promising more effective cholesterol lowering, may be another example. Historically, one may
think about a range of ACE-inhibitors, or more recently the new oral anticoagulants. While
much energy is spent to distinguish them, the real differences seem small and societies might
have been better off if development of some of these had stopped earlier and resources been
diverted elsewhere.
It might appear that an obvious weakness of the proposed policy is that the “winning”
firm’s drug is the one that is selected when the runner-up drug might have been significantly
better. However, it is again the particular nature of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry which
mitigates against such problems. Through the clinical trials process, quite a lot of information
is available in the public domain during the development stage. If the authority responsible for
implementing the policy can see that the laggard drug is very close to completion and/or looks
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significantly better than the winning firm’s drug then this can be taken into account before
employing the patent purchase policy on the winning drug. Our point is not that the patent
purchase approach should be used rigidly in the case of every new class of drug, but rather that
where the evidence suggests (e.g. as revealed through clinical trials) that the laggard firm is
significantly behind the winning firm and/or the laggard firm’s drug looks likely to offer very
little in terms of added benefits, then potentially large gains can be made from the patent
purchase model.
In the main, our analysis is undertaken under simplifying assumptions, some of which
are for modelling expedience and transparency, whilst others, we believe, have some basis in
the pharmaceutical sector. However, in Section 4 we carry out analysis including simulations
allowing some of these assumptions to be relaxed (e.g. introducing rival drug competition, drug
heterogeneity, wasteful marketing expenditures and general equilibrium effects) and show that
non-trivial gains still exist from employing the patent purchase model. Indeed, by including
marketing and one general equilibrium consideration welfare gains are shown to rise steeply.
For simplicity we assume a World Government WG and employ a “pay-as-you-go” prize
scheme for the winning innovator based on drug sales so that the patent purchase policy doesn’t
require WG to be involved in large-scale funding of the policy (beyond operational costs) or
face the costs and risks of predicting market take-up. The “pay-as-you-go” system also reduces
the number of challenges involved in getting buy-in from each regional jurisdiction within WG
which is important if the duplication costs of laggard R&D are to be avoided. The assumption,
is however, not an essential part of the model.
Whilst under our case of “maximal” compensation, firms would expect to be no worse off
under policy B than A, despite welfare being higher in the former case, we do not attempt
(except for a basic exercise in Section 4) to take into account wider general equilibrium benefits
from policy B deriving from possible earlier development of new drugs. Indeed, it is possible
to generate situations in which both firms and society are better off under policy B relative
to A. However, we have focussed on compensation rules which have some degree of incentive
neutrality over policies A and B to reduce the extent to which the assumption of a constant
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rate of R&D (which is made throughout and we partly justify in the case of pharmaceuticals)
is realistic. Of course, in reality, by offering a more generous compensation rule it might be
possible to speed up the development of X as well as X+ (the drug that makes X obsolete)
and/or Y (a new unrelated drug), but this lies beyond the scope of the current paper.
There are a number of issues that policy-makers will need to resolve in terms of imple-
menting the patent purchase policy, not least, which “new” drugs to target with the policy.
For certain there will need to be an overhaul of the system of patenting for pharmaceuticals
since under the patent purchase policy much more will ride on the decision to award a patent.
However, as we have seen in the introductory discussion, unlike many other sectors, the quality
of information available in the public domain through the development stage of “new” drugs
makes pharmaceuticals something of a special case which lends itself particularly well to the
patent purchase idea. That said, there are a number of issues which lie beyond the scope of the
current paper but which require investigation in future research. Foremost amongst these are
(i) how multiple indications fit within the patent purchase policy, (ii) how a policy of maximis-
ing R&D incentives for firms by rewarding the winner with compensation closer to full surplus
using subsidies would work (requiring a general equilibrium analysis and, of course, subsidies),
(iii) under what conditions free-rider effects would arise amongst regional jurisdictions such
that the assumption of WG as a single decision-making authority would be compromised, and
(iv) how the policy framework would need to be adapted to account for complementary rather
than substitute R&D.
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Appendix A Proofs to Propositions
Proof to Proposition 1. First, note that total revenue is strictly increasing in p for p ∈ [0, pm). Second, under
policy A total revenue (α24β [T2 +T3]) is strictly greater than the highest compensation, Cmax (
α2
4β [T2 +T3]−cT2),
under policy B. Hence, the break-even price, p˜max, under policy B required to generate revenue equal to
Cmax is strictly lower than the price under policy A: p˜max < pm. Accordingly, the break-even quantity under
policy B is x˜max ∈ (xm, α). Since from Eq. (1) consumer surplus is strictly increasing in x for x < α and
given x˜max ∈ (xm, α), then consumer surplus under Cmax must be strictly greater than that under policy A.
Regarding welfare, policy B with Cmax is strictly superior over policy A for two reasons. From Eq. (2) welfare
is strictly increasing in x and decreasing in costs. However, under policy B with Cmax, x is strictly greater and
total costs are strictly smaller (by the amount cT2) relative to policy A.
Proof to Proposition 2. Given Cmax is the most generous of the feasible compensation rules and given total
revenue is strictly increasing in p in the relevant range, p˜ is strictly monotonically falling with less generous
compensation rules. Correspondingly, consumer surplus and welfare are monotonically increasing as compensa-
tion falls below Cmax, completing the proof.
Proof to Proposition 3. Let Hf be the gain in aggregate profit under policy B with “full” compensation relative
to policy A, hence:
Hf =
α2
8β T3 − cT2 (17)
which is strictly negative from Lemma 1(i).
Proof to Proposition 4. Let Gf be the gain in welfare under policy B with “full” compensation relative to policy
A, hence:
Gf =
α2
8β
[
T3
2 +
(
2T3(T2 − T3)0.5
)]
+ cT2 (18)
which is strictly positive, and clearly ∂Gf/∂T2 > 0. However:
∂Gf
∂T3
= α
2
8β
[
(T2 + T3)[2T3(T2 + T3)]0.5 − 12
]
(19)
which is positive iff (T2 + T3)[2T3(T2 + T3)]0.5 > 12 , which must must hold for T2, T3 > 0. Let Gmax be the gain
in welfare under policy B with “maximal” compensation relative to policy A, hence:
Gmax =
1
2β
[
βcT2 + (αβcT2(T2 + T3))0.5
]
(20)
which is strictly positive, and clearly ∂Gmax/∂T2 > 0 and ∂Gmax/∂T3 > 0. Finally, since welfare is strictly
greater under policy B than policy A but aggregate profit is weakly smaller, the gain in welfare under both Bf
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and Bmax must derive from increasing consumer surplus hence the gains in consumer surplus under policy Bf
and Bmax relative to policy A must be strictly increasing with T2 and T3, completing the proof.
Proof to Proposition 5. With early laggard withdrawal in period 1 with proportion µ of period 1 remaining,
the break-even price under maximal compensation with policy B is:
p˜max ≡ 12
[
α
β
−
(
c(T2 + µT1)
β(T2 + T3)
)0.5]
(21)
whilst the break-even price under “full” compensation, p˜f , which is unchanged by the early laggard withdrawal,
and is given by Eq. (14). Setting p˜f > p˜max and re-arranging completes the proof.
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